Abstract:

In Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Nonrecognized De Facto Regimes in International Law, Michael Schoiswohl-in a study based on research conducted at New York University's International Human Rights Clinic-addresses a topic that is becoming increasingly significant to international legal scholarship and practice: the obligations of de facto regimes in the sphere of human rights, and the enforcement thereof.

Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of 'Somaliland.' By Michael Schoiswohl. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004. Pp. xvi, 352. Index. $125, euro100.

In Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Nonrecognized De Facto Regimes in International Law, Michael Schoiswohl-in a study based on research conducted at New York University's International Human Rights Clinic-addresses a topic that is becoming increasingly significant to international legal scholarship and practice: the obligations of de facto regimes in the sphere of human rights, and the enforcement thereof. He does so in the specific context of Somaliland, which he describes as a unique case of secession from a collapsed state (Somalia).1 Schoiswohl notes that his aim is not to provide a general theoretical discourse, but to describe a valid legal framework applicable to Somaliland. His exposition is nevertheless applicable to other nonstate entities.

On June 26, 1960, the British protectorate of Somaliland became independent. Five days later, it joined with the Italian-administered UN trusteeship of southern Somaliland, and together they emerged as the Somali Republic (Somalia). The unification was opposed by the northern Somali population, which soon felt neglected, dominated, and marginalized by the national government in the south. In 1991, civil war broke out in Somalia, resulting in complete breakdown of government. Somalia effectively ceased to function as a state.2 In that same year, the authorities in the area covered by the former British protectorate declared the independent state of Somaliland. Though never recognized as a state by any other state, self-styled Somaliland enjoys a functioning government and administration, and is making fairly good political and economic progress. Apart from its involvement in the Somali civil war from 1994 to 1996, it has also enjoyed relative peace.

Schoiswahl's book is divided into three parts. In the first he examines the implications of nonrecognition on the status of de facto regimes, which are defined as nonstate entities exercising effective control over territory.3 He concludes that de facto regimes may be categorized as states despite the absence of recognition. In the second part Schoiswohl describes the history of Somalia and Somaliland, and examines Somaliland's claim to statehood, with the conclusion that it is effectively a state, despite not having been recognized as such. In the third part he turns to doctrinal analysis of the human rights obligations of nonstate entities. He proposes a functional approach to de facto regimes, whereby they are subject to international human rights obligations to the extent that they assume and exercise governmental tasks in the territory under their control.

At the outset, Schoiswohl argues that the different motivations for refusing to recognize de facto regimes as states are opaque and irrelevant, as they all have the same legal consequences. This claim is questionable. While political motives for refusing recognition are indeed difficult both to expose and to assess in legal terms, there is an important distinction between nonrecognition based on a legal obligation (that is, when the de facto regime is flawed by reason of some illegality associated with its creation)4 and nonrecognition based on political considerations.5 In the former case, nonrecognition has certain consequences required by law, and the nonrecognized entity is not a state. In the latter, the consequences of nonrecognition are left largely to the discretion of the nonrecognizing state and apply only on a bilateral level.6 Some of the reasons that Schoiswohl lists for the refusal to recognize Somaliland's statehood, such as anxiety over creating a weak and dependent state, are political. The lack of recognition by Somalia and the reluctance of the international community to recognize secessionist entities as states, however, raise complex issues that may border on legally based nonrecognition. Some elaboration of the consequences of nonrecognition-with reference to its grounds-would therefore have been appropriate in order to clarify the rules applicable to Somaliland.

Schoiswohl examines the relationship between effectiveness and state collapse, setting the general parameters for the analysis of Somaliland and Somalia. He considers the nature of recognition and the implications of its absence, with particular reference to secession and self-determination. The debate over the nature of recognition is an old one.

According to the constitutive theory, recognition creates (constitutes) the state. According to the declaratory theory, recognition is a political act, independent of the existence of a new state;7 it acknowledges (declares) "as a fact something which has hitherto been uncertain."8 Schoiswohl suggests that while the declaratory theory prevails in current doctrine, recognition may have what he calls "semi-constitutive" role. In borderline situations where doubts remain as to the factual fulfillment of the requirements of statehood, recognition by the international community tilts the balance toward statehood. Such recognition has an "evidential value" as to the existence of a state, and contributes to the fulfillment of the criteria for statehood (particularly the criterion of effective control).

Conversely, nonrecognition presumptively reflects, he argues, nonfulfillment of the traditional criteria of statehood (particularly the absence of effective control). He then applies this theory to secessionist entities. He notes that the refusal of recognition by the parent state casts doubt as to the stability and effectiveness of the secessionist entity. This element of doubt raises the threshold of effectiveness required for the entity to qualify as a state. International recognition of the secessionist entity, when it occurs, is semi-constitutive in that it enables the entity to meet this higher threshold. Nonrecognition, however-unless it is politically motivated-will generally support the presumption of ineffectiveness.

Events following the breakup of Yugoslavia illustrate the notion that recognition is semi-constitutive in the sense used by Schoiswohl. BosniaHerzegovina became a state because it was recognized as such, even though its government did not exercise effective control over the entire territory that it was claiming.9 Nevertheless, Schoiswohl's argumentation is questionable on two grounds. One involves what is, in part, a terminological issue. The original constitutive theory addressed the question whether recognition was a sine qua non for statehood when all other conditions were fulfilled. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Schoiswohl's use of die term "constitutive" concern a different question-namely, whether recognition is sufficient to generate statehood when the other conditions are not all fulfilled. The use of the term "constitutive" in this sense is therefore somewhat misleading. To conclude on the basis of Schoiswohl's analysis that recognition is semi-constitutive is not tantamount to rejection of the declaratory theory, because this analysis concerns a question that is different from the one traditionally debated.

The other flaw in Schoiswohl's argumentation concerns the relationship between recognition and its absence. In many instances Schoiswohl states the implications of recognition and then deduces that when recognition fails, the implications are just the reverse. This exercise of construing the implications of nonrecognition by reversing the implications of recognition is replicated later in the book, when Schoiswohl introduces the impact of self-determination on the requirements of effectiveness and recognition.10 He examines case law that demonstrates, in his opinion, that the lack of a right to self-determination deters states from granting recognition to an entity;11 he deduces that where the right does exist, nonrecognition is of little significance. This form of argument is simply invalid: although recognition may serve as a substitute for effectiveness in generating statehood, lack of recognition does not mean lack of effectiveness. Schoiswohl notes as much but nevertheless proceeds to conclude that refusal by the international community to recognize an entity as a state leaves doubt as to the viability of the entity unless the refusal to recognize is manifestly motivated by political considerations. This conclusion would appear to undermine Schoiswohl's own premise that Somaliland is clearly a viable, effective entity even though the international community withholds recognition from it. Here, for example, the grounds for nonrecognition are pertinent, and as noted earlier, the absence of their analysis, regrettable.

Throughout his book, Schoiswohl assumes that recognition is a component of statehood that may be balanced against other components. Yet the interplay between recognition, self-determination, and effectiveness should not be regarded as a zero-sum game. Indeed, the conceptual difficulties surrounding recognition stem from its being independent of other requirements (unless one adopts Lauterpacht's theory of a duty of recognition where all other conditions are in existence,12 but this theory has never been popular and does not resolve a situation where the duty is breached).

Schoiswohl summarizes his analysis of the relationship between effectiveness, state collapse, recognition, and secession by claiming that the more effective a secessionist entity is, the more declaratory-that is, redundant-recognition becomes. He goes on to conclude that when a clearly effective entity (as he shows Somaliland to be) secedes from a collapsed state (which he shows Somalia to be), it can be legally categorized as a state, notwithstanding the absence of international recognition. He does note, however, the difficulty facing all proponents of the declaratory theory-namely, that statehood has little practical significance unless complemented by recognition.

The second part of the book describes the historical events in Somalia and Somaliland, and analyzes various claims put forward in support of Somaliland's right to statehood. Schoiswohl considers the historic claim to tide of Somaliland, the right of its population to self-determination, and the Somali government's denial of this population's human rights prior to Somaliland's 1991 declaration of independence. He rejects all these arguments as unsustainable grounds for secession, but then finds that Somaliland ought to be considered a state on the basis of its effective functioning, regardless of its not being entitled to what he considers "die right to secession." This reference to a right as yet unrecognized in international law is surprising in a book devoted to the legal consequences of secession.

The third part of the book picks up where the first part left off. Abandoning what he justifiably dubs "doctrinal Utopia" (p. 193), Schoiswohl attempts to assess the legal consequences resulting from Somaliland's de facto existence-in particular, the obstacles to ensuring and enforcing human rights obligations in the absence of recognition of statehood. He approaches this problem by identifying the specific norms that govern the actions of nonstate entities. This is by far the most interesting part of the book. It does away with the Utopian-but also, dare one say, futile and abstract-discussion of the nature of recognition and the significance of its absence. Instead, Schoiswohl embarks on an investigation of a matter dial is of growing practical concern: the applicability of human rights obligations to nonstate actors.13 His analysis exceeds the narrow parameters applicable to Somaliland, as it includes analogies from national liberation movements and other groups involved in armed conflict, categories within which Somaliland does not precisely fall.

Schoiswohl argues that "it is fairly well established that de facto regimes enjoy some international legal personality, regardless of whether they have been recognized as such or not" (p. 210). He bases this claim on the desirability of such attribution of rights and obligations in order that the "legitimate international legal 'function' [of de facto regimes], so to speak, will consist of meeting the needs articulated by the international community; and to the extent necessitated by these given 'needs', de facto authorities will enjoy international legal status" (p. 211). The international needs arise from the de facto authorities being the sole effective authorities within a given region. Schoiswohl goes on to argue, however, that it is not the international legal personality that enables de facto regimes to enter into international relations, but the other way round: "it is the abstract acceptance by the international legal community-necessitated by the practical needs to acknowledge its existence-to treat it as an entity with some sort of personality, which correspondingly endows it with its international legal status to the extent necessary to meet the needs of international society" (p. 212).

What Schoiswohl actually attempts here is to establish the existence a new category of legal subjects of international law-that of "de facto regimes." But that is not the state of the law today. International legal personality for de facto regimes as such is still, at most, de kgeferenda. Furthermore, an international legal personality for a de facto regime is a contradiction in terms. Personality implies recognition-whether as a state or otherwise. This line of argument reflects Schoiswohl's greatest shortcoming: he equates nonrecognition exclusively with nonrecognition of statehood. This equivalence leads him to pile together all nonstate actors, including national liberation movements and secessionist entities. Yet nonrecognition of statehood is but one instance of nonrecognition. Indeed, de facto regimes may have rights and obligations despite nonrecognition as states, but these rights and obligations are contingent upon their recognition as some other subject of international law. For example, national liberation movements are recognized as international legal persons for certain purposes of international humanitarian law under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) is recognized as a "separate customs territory" for the purposes of membership in the World Trade Organization. Schoiswohl ignores these legal categories, and directly applies the norms governing them to "de facto regimes" as an all-inclusive category. Analogy may be appropriate in moving from existing categories to others, but analogy is all that it is. In some cases Schoiswohl acknowledges this limitation. For example, he compares de facto regimes to belligerents, whose limited international personality is related to their involvement in armed conflict Yet belligerents, as Schoiswohl accepts, are an already recognized category under international law.

This logical leap-from specific nonstate actors to all de facto regimes-leads Schoiswohl to the conclusion that de facto regimes, by definition, have some limited international personality inherent in their governmental functioning, and are thus endowed with some rights and obligations under customary international law. He once again argues that de facto regimes can be classified as states, particularly when they emerge within a state that has entirely collapsed. Although it is fair to say that his argumentation is too quick here, the examples he gives are very pertinent to the claim that de facto regimes constitute a separate category of international persons. He mentions the rules of procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which apply to a "self-proclaimed entity de facto exercising governmental functions, whether recognised as a State or not."14

He also mentions American case law, which found the proscription of torture applicable to a person acting "under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation," as being applicable specifically to the self-proclaimed, nonrecognized Bosnian-Serb Republic of Srpska.15 These two precedents are of interest, as they rely solely on the de facto character of the entities in question. It is unfortunate that Schoiswohl does not pursue this line of inquiry. Instead, he regards these two examples as establishing (within limits) "statehood despite non-recognition"-a matter that was exhaustively discussed in the first part of the book.

Leaving aside the matter of statehood, Schoiswohl considers other sources of human rights obligations that may be relevant to de facto regimes. A first category is that of obligations undertaken voluntarily, whether contractually or unilaterally. In the context of contractual obligations, Schoiswohl considers the growing phenomena of peace agreements between de facto regimes and governments, and of memorandums of understanding between de facto regimes and international organizations, that contain extensive human rights provisions. Combining the functional approach (according to which nonstate entities assume legal capacity to the extent required by the needs of the international community) and the increasing role of human rights as "international community needs," he concludes that "it appears inevitable to endow de facto regimes with the necessary capacity to enter into such agreements" (p. 225) and that these agreements therefore qualify as international treaties. As examples he cites the 1990 agreement between El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Mart� para Ia Liberaci�n Nacional (FMLN),16 and the 1994 agreement between Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (GNRU).17

These examples raise a number of issues. First and foremost, it is not clear that either the FMLN or the GNRU meet Schoiswohl's definition of a de facto regime. If they do not (particularly in the absence of territorial control), their practice can serve as a guideline only by analogy. Furthermore, it is not clear how agreements concluded between governments (and functioning ones, at that) and bodies operating within the same states automatically qualify as "international." By themselves, neither the reference in the agreements to international human rights standards as a benchmark nor the extensive provisions for UN verification of the process render the obligations subject to international law. Nevertheless, Schoiswohl argues that "human rights components forming part of broader international efforts of peace-building in civil war torn countries escape their domestic confinement and thereby achieve international status" (p. 235). Once again, this conclusion does not reflect existing law but is only a potential direction of development.

A second method by which de facto regimes may voluntarily become bound by international human rights obligations is through unilateral undertakings. As an example Schoiswohl gives the declaration of the Sudan People's Liberation Army that it would observe the obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.18 De facto regimes often undertake such commitments in order to gain legitimacy and status. Schoiswohl notes that the significance of unilateral undertakings is primarily political, and that they can serve to exert political pressure on de facto regimes. Whatever the intention behind the undertaking, if it leads to a higher standard of observance of human rights law within the de facto regime in question, that aim is ultimately achieved.

Schoiswohl goes on to examine a series of legal standards that may apply to de facto regimes nonvoluntarily. He first explores the application of minimum standards of humanity, as embodied in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in Additional Protocol II. He concludes that these standards may be applicable to de facto regimes involved in internal armed conflicts. Another means for expanding the obligations of de facto regimes is the emerging soft law on minimum humanitarian standards applicable to all situations of internal violence and in the gray zone between war and peace.19 Finally, Schoiswohl considers criminal offenses under international lawsuch as genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture-that give rise to individual responsibility; their enforcement is therefore less dependent on the status of the political structure within which an accused individual operates. Indeed, under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the specific offenses are not limited to state functionaries, although their inclusion under the categories of crimes against humanity (Article 7) and war crimes (Article 8) requires a widespread or systematic attack, or a plan, policy, or large-scale commission of crimes, all of which are more likely to be carried out by an effective political mechanism. The requirement of a political mechanism, not necessarily equivalent to a state, makes these crimes particularly applicable to de facto regimes.

Schoiswohl also examines whether there are sources of human rights obligations that may apply to de facto regimes by virtue of their exercise of governmental functions. The first obligations he considers are those owed to nationals of third-party states. He suggests that de facto regimes may be responsible for violations of the property or bodily integrity of such individuals. He emphasizes the elusiveness of the rule of international law that is violated by the de facto regime. However, international law addresses such violations only in the context of secondary rules concerning the responsibility of states for the conduct of de facto regimes that are insurrectional movements, and does not establish the primary rules on the responsibility of the de facto regime. Under the rules of state responsibility, the state becomes responsible for the conduct of the insurrectional movements within its territory in the post-insurrection period-that is, when the de facto regime has either taken over as government of the territory or has been defeated and no longer exists.20 The de facto regime as such is not held responsible. The other type of responsibility that de facto regimes may bear is for internal nonobservance of human rights-that is, toward individuals living under their authority. Schoiswohl identifies two obstacles to attributing such responsibility to a de facto regime. One is the possibility that such attribution would be construed as implied recognition. This begs the question, however, for if accountability is possible without recognition, then it cannot imply recognition. The second obstacle is the difficulty of identifying the primary norms that apply to de facto regimes beyond some minimum humanitarian standards applicable to noninternational conflict.

Finally, Schoiswohl asks whether and to what extent de facto authorities might be entitled under international law to assume human rights functions because of their effective governance and the devolution of administrative functions from the parent state to the de facto regime. He reviews doctrinal bases, such as implied mandate and necessity, upon which acts of nonrecognized de facto regimes might be given effect. The implied mandate theory legitimizes the status of a usurper government's authority on the ground that the legitimate sovereign implicitly grants the usurper the mandate to rule the territory. This doctrine was elaborated by Grotius21 with regard to usurper governments within a state, in its courts and under domestic law. Schoiswohl proposes that the de facto regime is bound by at least the same obligations as the parent state because its mandate derives from the parent state. But this effort to apply the implied mandate doctrine to secessionist de facto regimes is open to criticism. Among other things, the doctrine has never clearly been applied.22 Furthermore, the doctrine concerns the status of a nonrecognized administration usurping a recognized government when there is no challenge to the state's territorial integrity. It bears no direct relation to a de facto regime that purports to separate from the recognized parent state. In this latter case, the mandate of the de facto regime does not derive from the parent state and is therefore not limited by any standard applicable to the latter. Unlike the implied mandate theory (the focus of the preceding remarks), necessity serves a wider, also international context23 and is therefore the more interesting. It gives effect to the consequences of the acts of de facto regimes in situations where to do otherwise would run contrary to peace and good order.24

Concluding, Schoiswohl notes the paucity of norms available to bind nonstate entities by international human rights obligations; he suggests that such obligations should bind any authority, whether recognized or not. For this purpose, human rights should be detached from issues of statehood or recognition.

Schoiswohl's volume provides a systematic review of an issue that so far has been considered only in a fragmented way. It provides an exhaustive and detailed discussion of many routes by which human rights obligations may be extended to nonstate actors, highlighting each approach's limitations and advantages. The book's main deficiency is the tendency to rely on the law applicable to nonstate actors that are already subject to certain international legal obligations, such as national liberation movements. This is methodologically problematic. First, these nonstate actors already have a limited international legal personality, albeit not that of state. second, they might not even qualify as de facto regimes as defined by Schoiswohl-for example, if they do not exercise effective control over territory. In this context, and without exploring the analogy or logical extension in detail, it is unpersuasive to attribute the law applicable to a certain category of nonstate actors to all de facto regimes. This is particularly true given the focus of Schoiswohl's study. For example, since Somaliland is not characterized by involvement in armed conflict, the analogy from the obligations of belligerents or national liberation movements under Additional Protocol I is of limited relevance. If this limit is not immediately apparent to the reader, it is because Schoiswohl specifically refers to Somaliland only in the second part of the book, where he considers its claim to statehood despite nonrecognition. The subsequent, doctrinal discussion on human rights obligations in the absence of recognition makes no reference to Somaliland. It is left to the reader to apply the doctrinal discussion to the earlier discussed factual situation in Somaliland.

A few words on editorial matters. It is difficult to identify the hierarchy and relationship among the sections of the text. The table of contents-unformatted, with headings that give little clue as to content-is of little help. Another cumbersome feature is the use of parentheses-not to clarify or add information, but to qualify subsequent words. Even the title of the book suffers from this obscure stylistic device.

Despite its methodological difficulties, Schoiswohl's volume is a thorough elucidation of the state of the law and, even more, an analysis of where the law can go. Hopefully, the book will lead to further clarification and elaboration of the law governing de facto regimes and their human rights obligations.

[Footnote]

1 By "collapsed state" Schoiswohl means that the state's structure, authority, law, and political order have fallen apart, and that the disruption of domestic political order is manifest in violent conflict, fragmentation of authority, and humanitarian disaster. The government is then unable to discharge basic functions with respect to the population and territory. Somalia is, according to Schoiswohl, the only actual case of a collapsed state (which he distinguishes from failed states, a less extreme form of disintegration, of which there are many examples, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa).

2 In 2004, just before Schoiswohl's book went to press, an internal peace initiative began in Somalia. The fighting continues, however, and no government has yet assumed power.

3 Schoiswohl's definition largely corresponds to the traditional definition of a state as reflected in the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933,165 LNTS 19, reprinted in 28 AJIL SUPP. 75 (1934), Article 1 of which provides:

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:

(a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory;
(c) government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

4 For example, the international responses to Ian Smith's regime in southern Rhodesia, SC Res. 216 (Nov. 12, 1965), and to the creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, SC Res. 541 (Nov. 18, 1983).

5 For example, with regard to the Western bloc's refusal to recognize the German Democratic Republic until the early 1970s.

6 Even then, the statehood of the nonrecognized entity remains opposable to the nonrecognizing state. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1979).

7 Id.

8 JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 139 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).

9 The same could be said for Congo, later Zaire, today the Democratic Republic of the Congo. CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 42-43.

10 Surprisingly, however, he does not consider its impact on statehood.

11 Reference re secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Can.); Loizidou v. Turkey, 199&-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2241 (concurring opinion of Wildehaber and Ryssdal, JJ.).

12 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1947).

13 Since Schoiswohl's analysis relies heavily on the law applicable to nonstate actors involved in armed conflict, much of it concerns international humanitarian law and not international human rights law.

14 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 2, at (definition of "state").

15 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). This judgment preceded the Dayton Accords, which gave the Republika Srpska a formal status.

16 Agreement on Human Rights, July 26, 1990, El Sal.-Frente Farabundo Mart� para Ia Liberaci�n Nacional, m UN Doc. S/21541 (1990).

17 Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, Mar. 29, 1994, Guat.-Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, 36 ILM 276 (1997).

18 Surprisingly, he fails to examine whether declarations of undertaking have been made under Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which specifically provides for such a step and attaches binding legal consequences to it.

19 see, e.g., Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards at Turku/Abo (1990), in Asbjorn Eide, Allan Rosas, & Theodor Meron, Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts Through Minimum Humanitarian Standards, 89 AJIL 215, 219 (1995).

20 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 10, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at , reprinted in CRAWFORD, supra note 6.

21 HUGO GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI Ac PACK 1.4.15, quoted in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 645, 728-29 (P.C. 1968).

22 Cf. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke.

23 see, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 732 (1868); Hesperides hotels Ltd. v. Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd., 1978 Q.B. 205; Sokoloff v. Nat'1 City Bank of New York, 239 N.Y. 158 (1924). ^

24 In 2001 the European Court of Human Rights recognized the courts of the de facto regime of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" as domestic remedies to be exhausted before recourse to the European Court is permitted. Cyprus v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 35 (2002) (fourth interstate application). The goal was specifically to widen the guarantees of human rights for individuals living under a de facto regime. This recognition could be said to apply to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus not directly as a de facto regime, but as a subordinate administration under Turkish occupation. Occupying powers (although Turkey was not formally designated as one) are also a recognized category of legal persons under international law.